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WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A SEA TREATY

by Ann L. Hollick

The third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS III)[1] met for 12 weeks—two in New York in December 1973 and 10 in Caracas from June through August 1974. The next round—eight weeks this time—is planned to begin in mid-March 1975 in Geneva, and subsequent sessions are contemplated for Vienna and/or Caracas. The official goal of this lengthy exercise is to prepare a single treaty that will be both "comprehensive" and "widely accepted." Defining a successful conference in such terms virtually ensures that LOS III will fail to carry out its official goal. With 25 agenda items (covering numerous issues) and about 140 delegations to the conference, a detailed treaty could not be widely accepted[2] and a widely accepted treaty could not be comprehensive.

This raises the question as to whether the kind of treaty likely to be acceptable at LOS III would be better than no treaty at all. In terms of the management of ocean resources, the legal regime emerging at the conference is seriously deficient. And from the perspective of international equity the likely outcome is a worsening of the already monumental gap between the poorest nations and the rest of the world.

From the United States' perspective, however, none of the probable outcomes of LOS III will be seriously disadvantageous. In the

[1] *Conferences I and II were held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960.*

[2] *If a comprehensive treaty were drawn up, a situation might develop in which nations approved it with reservations to those portions deemed unacceptable. If nations adhered in this manner, the net effect would be a treaty accepted by a majority rather than a universal or widely accepted treaty.*

An earlier article on ocean policy by Ann L. Hollick, "Seabeds Make Strange Politics," appeared in FOREIGN POLICY 9.

unlikely event that no treaty results from the conference, the United States will nonetheless be able to protect its essential interests in the oceans. On the other hand, the majority sentiment, which was evident at Caracas, and which will probably be recognized in a statement to the U.N. General Assembly or in a treaty, is entirely in accord with U.S. territorial interests. That sentiment is for maximum extensions of coastal state jurisdiction—to 12-mile territorial seas, to 200-mile resource zones, and to the living and nonliving resources adjacent to those zones. A partial treaty to this effect is being sought by the numerous island and coastal states participating in the conference. Whether or not the treaty contains detailed provisions for navigational and other international uses of the oceans, as the United States presently insists is necessary, this country will benefit significantly from extensions of jurisdiction. Off its own lengthy coastline, the United States enjoys substantial resources and would gain more territory (2.2 million square miles) than any other nation under a 200-mile economic or resource zone. The U.S. continental margin extends beyond 200 miles in some areas, as do its offshore fishery resources.

With regard to deep-sea mining, U.S. firms reputedly lead other nations in mining technology. Since a significant portion of the commercially attractive nodules could fall under the newly expanded national jurisdiction of Pacific Ocean islands, enterprising firms may be invited by nodule-owning states to mine those resources, thereby evading whatever onerous restrictions might be incorporated in an international seabed authority. Indeed, if the provisions for a deep-seabed regime are too offensive to the developed nations in an era of resource scarcity, their governments may simply ignore the treaty and encourage their firms to go ahead with consortia arrangements providing for reciprocal recognition of the mining claims of others.

A primary U.S. concern, of course, is that

coastal state expansion in the absence of a treaty will result in restrictions on navigation, whether of oil tankers or of military vessels. In the absence of treaty-guaranteed rights of transit through international straits, officials have argued, obstacles to navigation might be posed by coastal and straits nations. But when a number of developing nations are engaged in building their own merchant marines, and other developing nations find themselves heavily dependent on international commerce, it is difficult to foresee any international sentiment for adverse restrictions on commercial mobility. However, the imposition of tolls to cover the costs of managing congested international straits is a possible development. It is true that coastal states strongly resent offshore naval activities of maritime nations. But it is equally unlikely that military transit will be prevented if the major naval powers remain united on this issue. No government would lightly risk the humiliation of having its challenge to straits transit resisted by the naval powers acting in concert. If, on the other hand, a straits state were supported by a superpower in closing the strait to transit by others, an international treaty guaranteeing free transit would scarcely provide a useful safeguard.

The Double Irony

The projected outcome of a treaty (or statement) extending national jurisdiction but unable to effectively control and regulate deep-sea mining and navigation is doubly ironic. Since 1970, the United States has been foremost among those who have urged that a comprehensive and widely acceptable treaty is indispensable to this nation's interests in the oceans. Indeed, the U.S. government has worked hard in moving its domestic interests to a more internationally acceptable position in the negotiations. The official premise of U.S. policy in this regard has been that an internationally agreed upon treaty is necessary to avoid conflicts in the oceans and to secure U.S. rights there. Yet

it will be the United States, among other developed nations, that will benefit most if no treaty or only a minimal treaty emerges enshrining the expansionist tendencies at work in LOS III.[3] The second irony becomes apparent when it is recalled that it was the developing countries, through the Group of 77, that pressed for recognition of 200-mile zones in a single comprehensive treaty as a means of countering the major maritime powers' interest in freedom of the seas. But only a small number of developing nations will benefit—those with long coasts and abundant offshore resources. The big losers will be the landlocked and shelflocked nations, countries with short coastlines, and countries with comparatively few resources off their coasts—a group of nations which includes among its numbers the poorest countries of the world.

Caracas Perspective

A brief review of the progress at the Caracas session of LOS III and the difficulties inherent in this international negotiation suggests why, if there is a treaty result, it will be either a widely accepted partial treaty or a comprehensive treaty accepted by a simple majority.

Compared to the work of the U.N. Seabed Committee and the procedural session of LOS III in New York, Caracas was notable for hard work, long hours, few polemics, and attention to detail. After two weeks in New York and some intersessional negotiations, agreement on a voting formula[4] was reached allowing the rules of procedure to be adopted at the end of the first week of

[3] *Under a 200-mile zone, 35 countries will acquire 50 per cent of the total ocean space to be enclosed. Among the 35 are 10 "leading" countries which among themselves share 30 per cent of the 200-mile zones. Data from Lewis Alexander, "Geographical Factors and Patterns of Alignments," Ocean Policy Project Conference, Airlie House, October 21-24, 1974.*

[4] *This formula combines a "gentleman's agreement" on efforts to reach a consensus with a requirement for substantive decisions of "a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting provided that majority shall include at least a majority of the states participating in that session of the Conference."*

the session. The three main committees[5] of LOS III worked diligently, and by the end of the session had succeeded in sharpening the different perspectives and in preparing alternative treaty texts. In essence, the committees completed the preparatory work that should have been done before the conference and laid the groundwork for future negotiations.

The fact that actual negotiations and compromises of different positions did not occur at Caracas is symptomatic of the difficulties facing LOS III. Those difficulties may be summed up in two factors—the size of the agenda and the number of negotiating parties. Whatever the capabilities of the LOS negotiators, the task of negotiating durable international regimes for each of the ocean issues on the agenda in a single text is beyond the capacity of this political forum. Indeed, LOS III can be compared with an effort to combine in a single international decision-making process the issues before the Stockholm Conference on the Environment, the SALT negotiations, the U.N. Energy Conference, and the Rome Food Conference. The creation of optimum management regimes for matters as diverse as shipping, military transit, environment, living resources, petroleum, and hard minerals requires isolating each issue from the others and addressing it on its own merits and in terms of its unique characteristics. The apparent goal of LOS III, however, is to trade these issues off in a political package rather than to develop efficient management systems.

The second difficulty of the negotiating exercise—the number of participants—relates directly to the first. Presenting the nations of the world with a lengthy and heterogeneous list of negotiating issues creates numerous interest groups and subgroups on

[5] *The agenda items are allocated unevenly among the committees. The First Committee is responsible for seabed mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The Second Committee deals with a variety of law of the sea matters, including the territorial sea, the economic or resource zone, the continental shelf, fishing, and navigation. The Third Committee handles marine pollution and scientific research.*

each topic. The groupings are based on level of economic development, geographical and resource situations, regional cohesion, and ideological differences. The broadest division is between the developed and the developing nations. This cleavage is most pronounced on the high technology issues of deep-sea mining and scientific research. Other negotiating groups are based on geographical circumstances and the vagaries of oceanic resource distribution. These groups band together over the issue of extending coastal state jurisdiction. The landlocked and shelf-locked group of about 40 nations has pursued the goal of either limiting the extensions of offshore jurisdictions or, if extensions cannot be avoided, of gaining access to the resources within the jurisdiction of their neighboring coastal states. Nations that have continental margins extending beyond 200 miles would like to ensure their jurisdiction over the anticipated petroleum resources of these areas. And another group of countries claims preferential rights to fisheries beyond their 200-mile zones.

Island and archipelago states pose a special set of problems. In extensions of jurisdiction, island states want to enjoy the same rights as continental states, regardless of whether the islands or rocks from which these extensions are measured are inhabitable or even above water. Between the outermost points of archipelagic states, the intent is to draw straight baselines and claim archipelagic waters within—with 200-mile zones extending beyond that. However, coastal states with islands of other countries off their shores oppose according them a full economic zone. A further complication rests in the assertion of developing countries that islands under foreign domination or control should not be allowed 200-mile resource zones.

Other interest groups in LOS III are not unique to the oceans. The regional groupings of the United Nations are instruments for allocating chairmanships and decision-making rights in the conference. They also bring to the negotiations distinctive regional ap-

proaches. Soviet bloc attitudes toward ocean mining reflect their state-centered economic system. African positions reveal a history of regional cooperation and close liaison between member states as well as a large proportion of African landlocked states. States bordering semienclosed seas, such as the Caribbean and North Sea, have fished each other's waters for decades and are attempting to develop new modes of allocating rights to dwindling resources. Member nations of the European Community have been preoccupied throughout the Law of the Sea Conference with reaching agreed positions, but with only a modicum of success to date.

While the cohesion of states according to interests may often be a prerequisite to a successful, international negotiation, it has proved counterproductive in the law of the sea discussions. The number and variety of issues yield too many groups with overlapping and crosscutting memberships. This has created high transaction costs, with efforts to coordinate policy within the groups absorbing so much time that negotiation between contending groups rarely takes place.

Certainly a number of other impediments exist to the conclusion of a satisfactory law of the sea treaty. Some nations are interested in delaying the negotiations either because their interests in the oceans are not yet clearly perceived or, in other cases, because they expect to realize gains in their position by delays. Working in the opposite direction in the developed countries are domestic pressures to resolve specific ocean regimes so that commercial and strategic users may go about their business without further uncertainties or delays. The opposing forces for delay and completion of the conference have complicated the process of reaching agreement. Until the final session is scheduled, no parties can be expected to make compromises. And until the major parties all agree that a treaty is necessary, the date of the final session cannot be set.

In 1973, U.S. officials told the Congress

that 1975 was the year when the LOS conference must emerge with a treaty. Since then, the Administration has been careful to avoid specifying a probable treaty date, while still insisting that a treaty is necessary. Congress, however, is considering bills to immediately extend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles until a treaty is agreed, and to undertake seabed mining if there is no treaty by January 1976.

Is No Treaty Better than Any Treaty?

The urgency of a treaty—especially the treaty that seems to be emerging from LOS III—is not self-evident.

The interest of the negotiators in achieving some result from the drawn-out negotiations almost rules out the possibility that nothing will emerge from the conference. The political nature of the forum and the diverse interests that are being accommodated in the negotiations determine that what does emerge will be the lowest common denominator—namely, maximum extensions of jurisdiction. With the exception of the landlocked and shelflocked, who will be either placated or ignored, every state should get something from this extension. Of course some will get more than others, the principal beneficiaries being certain developed countries, South American and island states.

Proposals now before the LOS conference indicate the shape of the treaty outcome. Twelve-mile territorial seas and 200-mile economic zones will be measured from new and extended straight baselines. In some cases, proposed baselines measure up to 400 miles in length, and in other cases they disregard land altogether and are based on water depths or geographical coordinates. Additional claims are being made to continental margins and fishery resources which extend beyond the economic zone. While more than 20 countries have margins reaching such distances, only a handful of states will benefit significantly and are active in pressing for coastal state jurisdiction to the resources of the continental shelf beyond the economic

zone.[6] Other nations, such as those on the west coast of Latin America, that are not endowed with offshore mineral resources, are seeking compensation in the form of fisheries resources off their shores. Ecuador, Panama, and Peru therefore have claimed preferential rights to the living resources adjacent to their 200-mile zones. Similarly, the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union are seeking exclusive rights to salmon spawning in their rivers.

The area remaining beyond national jurisdiction will contain manganese nodules primarily, and of course nodules will also be found within newly expanded areas of jurisdiction. Given the limited resources that will fall to the international regime, the conference may decide that to achieve compliance of the technologically advanced nations only minimal machinery will be accepted, combined with principles and codes of behavior for activities undertaken in the area.

The third major element of any law of the sea treaty relates to navigational rights within resource zones and through and over straits that will be covered by 12-mile territorial seas. The United States and the Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain, and other maritime nations have been united in their support of "unimpeded transit through international straits" and "no interference with nonresource uses of the economic zone." Indeed the United States and the Soviet Union have predicated their acceptance of an international treaty upon satisfaction of these navigation rights. Given this unyielding position, it is doubtful that the treaty will impose restrictions or controls on navigation through international straits, regardless of the growing congestion and need for traffic regulation in these areas. It is likely, therefore, that states bordering on international straits will be nonsignatories. In the economic zone, some legal formula will doubtless be devised that satisfies the coastal states' sentiment for sovereignty while allowing an interpretation satisfactory to shipping and naval interests. The problems will arise in everyday usage as these different interpretations are applied. Coastal state application of international environmental regulations will probably also be couched in judicious language capable of conflicting interpretations.

[6] *Ignoring the effect of a 200-mile zone and measuring the continental shelf to a depth of 3,000 meters, the following nations taken together control almost half of the continental margins of the world: Australia—1,445,400 sq. miles (10.83 per cent of world margins); Canada—1,240,000 sq. miles (9.29 per cent); Indonesia—1,229,800 sq. miles (9.21 per cent); the United States—862,600 sq. miles (6.46 per cent); the Soviet Union—735,900 sq. miles (5.51 per cent); New Zealand—571,000 sq. miles (4.28 per cent); Argentina—484,100 sq. miles (3.63 per cent). Data from U.S. Department of State,* International Boundary Study, *Series A: "Limits in the Seas," No. 46: "Theoretical Areal Allocations of Seabed to Coastal States," August 12, 1972.*

The drawbacks of such an outcome, embodied in a treaty or other document, are apparent. The process of enclosing major portions of the oceans will exacerbate existing international inequities and generate more conflicts than it resolves. The poorer landlocked and shelflocked nations will receive little if anything from the national extensions. And the shifting of boundaries itself will generate numerous disputes between neighboring countries. Where sharp regional hostilities exist, the resolution of these differences will approximate the Greek-Turkish conflict over islands rather than the peaceful North Sea model division of the sea floor.

Perhaps the most damaging critique of the probable treaty is that it is a shortsighted response to the implications of a growing world population and a potential resource shortage. While national sovereignty may work for the management of fixed mineral resources, it cannot suffice to regulate marine pollution or certain stocks or ecological systems of fish.[7] Indeed, given past performance of nations in areas of exclusive jurisdiction, serious doubts must be raised about the capabilities of even the most developed countries to manage optimally the resources of large

[7] *And when oil pools stretch across artificially drawn boundary lines, the result may be simultaneous and inefficient recovery of the resources.*

and arbitrarily drawn ocean zones.[8] Where the uses of an environment are multiple and interdependent, the management regime must be appropriate to the resource in question and will require cooperative international and national regulation.

The Third Law of the Sea Conference has not generated any long-range schemes for the conservation and management of ocean resources. Nor has it given much attention to means of strengthening and improving existing international ocean institutions. By the time that the need for this has become critical and self-evident, the LOS III treaty outcome may have locked nations into positions they cannot yield. This prospect sharpens the question of whether no treaty would be better than the treaty that will probably be agreed to in 1975 or 1976. At least a no-treaty result might allow future flexibility to devise necessary management institutions when the problems of congestion and ocean resource depletion become acute and schemes designed to optimize ocean resources become unavoidable. On the other hand, a no-treaty result could lead to the very same extensions of jurisdiction by coastal states. Although not enshrined in an international convention, these extensions would eventually be accepted as customary international law. The end result might, therefore, be the same. Moreover, there is no assurance that if the present LOS negotiations were halted, to be resumed in three to 10 years, national governments would behave more wisely in developing an international regime for the effective management of ocean resources.

[8] *The record of international organizations, of course, has not been outstanding, but for different reasons. The inability to enforce decisions taken, rather than the parochial and interest-oriented nature of the decisions, has been at the root of most failures of international and regional bodies.*

Who Pays For Foreign Policy? A Debate On Consensus

Writing in FOREIGN POLICY 15, *Charles W. Maynes, Jr. posed a question—"Who Pays for Foreign Policy?"—and said, among other things, that "most Americans simply do not understand the totally disproportionate burden which working people have carried in both the defense and trade fields in recent years." Maynes concluded with a discussion of the "current search for a national consensus," and said: 'The government must find some way to convince the people that they should believe once again that their public leaders are acting in the best interests of the ordinary citizen. . . . The government will need to examine all policies, foreign or domestic, from the standpoint of their direct impact on the lives of ordinary citizens and whether the impact is equitable."*

In this issue, Earl C. Ravenal questions some of Maynes' assumptions and conclusions, and raises another critical question: do we want a consensus at all?

To some, these may seem like generalizations and abstractions, but they go to the very nature of what kind of foreign policy our democracy should conduct. To consider these questions, the Editors of FOREIGN POLICY *asked several distinguished observers of the American scene to comment on the debate between Maynes and Ravenal. Contributions here are from Richard A. Falk, Hans J. Morgenthau, Daniel P. Moynihan, Bruce M. Russett, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. After a rejoinder by Maynes, we offer Ravenal the last, brief word.*

WASHINGTON STAR March 29, 1975

Law of the Sea Conference

Representatives of some 140 nations and international organizations will be spending the next seven weeks at Geneva in what may be the final effort to work out a comprehensive Law of the Sea, governing the preservation and exploitation of the world's last great remaining source of energy, food and precious metals. If the effort fails, the outlook for an orderly sharing of what has been called the "common heritage of mankind" will be dismal indeed.

The outlook is not particularly encouraging as it is. The last session at Caracas, Venezuela, last summer got virtually nowhere, except on the general proposition of extending national territorial jurisdiction from the traditional three miles to 12 and establishing a 200-mile economic resource zone. The knottier problems, including deep seabed mining — for which few nations are technically equipped — undeveloped fish, mineral and petroleum resources, pollution, conservation and revenue-sharing with landlocked nations, all remain unresolved. The Caracas meeting was more notable for acrimonious argument along national and ideological lines than for any real progress toward accommodation.

Even the relatively simple 12-mile territorial limit poses serious problems for major maritime nations such as the United States. Some 100 straits, now classified as international waterways, would fall under national jurisdiction if such a treaty came into effect. The United States is insisting on the right of unimpeded passage through these straits as a condition of signing the agreement.

Yet the Geneva effort must succeed, if only because the alternative is all too likely to be total chaos. The principle that the sea itself — and especially the deep seabed with its potentially rich resources of copper, manganese, nickel and cobalt — is common property is surely a sound basis on which to proceed. All countries at this conference have a state in its success, the United States a greater stake than most.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 31, 1975

Hope for Accord Seen at Sea-Law Talks

By FLORA LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, March 27—After years of nearly fruitless wrangling, 150 nations are finally getting down to serious negotiation here to write what John R. Stevenson, the chief United States delegate, has called "a constitution for the oceans."

It is a race against time. "Events are overtaking us," said Lee Ratiner, adviser to the United States delegation at the Conference on the Law of the Sea here. "Technology that didn't exist when we started on this in 1968 has developed while the conference was blabbing."

Mr. Ratiner said in an interview: "We want desperately for the conference to succeed because that is the best way to pursue ocean mining. We cannot let this opportunity for ocean mining slip through our fingers."

U.S. Pressing for Haste

Mining the seabed is only one of the many issues before the conference. There are also questions of fishing rights, navigation, scientific research, environment—a complex of old and new problems for which there is not as yet any agreed set of rules.

The alternative, if rules cannot be established, Mr. Stevenson has said, is the extension of the 17th-century nation-state system to the two-thirds of the world under salt water, with the likelihood of extending the disputes and conflicts that nations have experienced on land.

The pressure for haste comes primarily from the United States but also from some other countries eager to develop both the fish and the mineral riches of the oceans at a time when the prospect of worldwide material shortages is looming.

The resistance comes primarily from developing countries that do not have the capacity to exploit the seas now but are determined to preserve their rights and prevent what many consider further selfish enrichment of countries that are already rich.

Reaction to C.I.A. Operation

The United States Department of the Interior has drawn up a bill, now being reviewed by the Administration, that would set a deadline of Jan. 31, 1976, when the Secretary of the Interior would be entitled to issue leases for deep-sea mining if no international treaty has been agreed upon.

The bill, not yet approved by President Ford, is itself a delaying device intended to head off a broader, more controversial bill prepared by Senator Lee Metcalf, Democrat of Montana, on behalf of the American Mining Congress.

A Peruvian delegate, speaking for the "Group of 77" developing nations, charged at the conference here last week that the Interior Department's draft meant that the United States was planning an "illegal" raid on the seas' resources before an international authority could be set up.

These conflicting pressures have led some American officials to call the current eight-week session a "make-or-break" conference. It should be clear by the time the session ends in May whether there is a chance of getting agreement on a treaty this year. If there is not, officials fear there may be a global scramble that could have dire results.

The revelation that the United States used the Glomar Explorer, ostensibly a deep-sea mining ship built by Howard Hughes, as the cover for an expensive effort by the Central Intelligence Agency to salvage a Soviet submarine in the Pacific has shaken the sea law conference and added to the difficulties of getting so many countries to agree on long-term rules.

United States officials here have been given strict orders not to comment in any way on the Glomar Explorer operation.

But Christopher Pinto, the chief Sri Lanka delegate, who is chairman of the working group on deep-sea mining, said that "fear of espionage is the reason for opposing full freedom of scientific research." Members of the Group of 77 argue that "their own security, and the security of our friends," might be compromised if there were no controls either on what appear to be purely scientific operations or on the to said.

The current conference is a follow-up to a wordy, unsuccessful negotiating attempt at Caracas, Venezuela, last year. Certain outlines of agreement have emerged.

The great majority of countries accept a new limit of 12 miles on territorial waters where coastal states will have full sovereignty. Beyond that, for a zone of 200 miles, coastal states would have "economic control" of fishing and the seabed.

Global Authority Planned

An international authority is projected for the high seas beyond the 200-mile zone, and it would be responsible for exploiting the resources of the oceans, collecting money for mining concessions and giving nonindustrial countries a share in developing the seas regardless of whether they have any coastline.

But there are a number of sharp differences on the details. The United States, the Soviet Union and other big states want guaranteed free passage through international straits even if these passages come within territorial waters.

Some countries, including the United States, Canada and Australia, claim oil rights on the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles.

Countries with long-distance fishing interests, including the United States, want guarantees of conservation and "full exploitation" of marine resources within the 200-mile zone. That is, a coastal state without the capacity to catch and dispose of available fish would have to contract out the rights in its zone to others capable of fishing there.

Washington Star March 23, 1975

U.S. Official Sees Sea Law Progress

GENEVA — A top American official said yesterday the week-old U.N. Law of the Sea Conference is showing "a very strong trend" to agreement on major issues.

John Norton Moore, deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the 150-nation talks, strongly denied reports that the session was near collapse. He said "there is a greater spirit of negotiation and movement then we ever saw" in Caracas, Venezuela, where the talks began last summer.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 March 1975

Brezhnev underlines detente

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Budapest

Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev reaffirmed the Soviet Union's commitment to detente with the West — particularly with the United States — in a speech to the Hungarian Communist Party congress here Tuesday. But, he said, constant progress was essential to maintain the momentum of detente.

It was the Soviet leader's first speech abroad since his absence from the public eye for almost two months at the start of the year.

"Peace is indivisible," Mr. Brezhnev said. "This is why, simultaneously with the struggle for a lasting peace in Europe, we pay the most serious attention to the strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, relations which are so important from the viewpoint of peaceful coexistence and are based on mutually advantageous cooperation."

But, he continued, "we cannot be satisfied with the achievements made so far. The consolidation of detente and peace is a permanent, ceaseless process, demanding constant progress. To stop on this road would jeopardize everything attained up to now."

Military reductions

Mr. Brezhnev noted that the reduction of armed forces and armaments, even gradual, could not be brought about at one stroke. However, he said, efforts to that end had already been initiated at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Vladivostok last fall, and in the current SALT (strategic arms limitation) talks at Geneva, and the mutual troop reduction talks in Vienna.

The Soviet leader renewed the call for an early summit-level final session of the 35-nation European security conference.

[Mr. Brezhnev has formally proposed June 30 as the date for the European summit, according to Western sources in Geneva, Reuter reported.

[The sources said Mr. Brezhnev's proposal was contained in a letter sent to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French President Giscard d'Estaing, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro.]

But, he said, it was "difficult to imagine that a lasting, guaranteed peace could exist in Europe alone while storm clouds blacken the skies over other continents."

"There still exist in the world dangerous centers of tension, hotbeds of conflict and potential war in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in other areas," he said.

Middle East proposals

He urged an early resumption of the Geneva conference, "the body set up for the purpose" of achieving a Middle East settlement. He repeated the Soviet demand for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 March 1975

Urgency on law of the sea

The tiniest landlocked states as well as the great coastal powers have a stake in the new session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Unless agreement on a draft treaty is reached this year, there is grave danger of slipping back into a worsened version of the anarchic conditions occurring between previous sea conferences.

To take just one of the new factors dictating urgency, technology now makes possible the deep-sea "mining" of manganese and other mineral "nodules." According to a 1970 UN resolution, the seas beyond national limits are the "common heritage of mankind." Thus landlocked states deserve a share in the seabed's mineral wealth, as do developing nations that do not have the technology to mine it. There is also the question of the economic impact of sea minerals on countries that depend on the land mining of such resources.

Yet there are already private corporate plans to begin exploitation of seabed minerals by 1976. Claims are being filed to remote areas of ocean bottom. If a sea treaty does not come out of this year's conference, a chaos of conflicting claims and interests can well be imagined.

And the question of mineral nodules is only one part of the conference's concern. Failure to reach agreement would leave the way open to a whole spectrum of invasions of national rights and evasions of national responsibility.

Last summer's Caracas session served to air differences and to reach the beginnings of agreement. A 12-mile territorial limit, for example, seems widely acceptable, though it ought to provide for passage through straits within that limit, as urged by the United States and others.

In addition, a 200-mile zone of economic jurisdiction for fishing and minerals is well on the way to acceptance. Here there is the question of whether to extend this rule to small islands, creating wildly disproportionate zones. The suggestion of a zone no more than 10 times the size of such an island seems more realistic.

There are also the matters of pollution control (from land activities as well as ships), conservation, freedom of research, and the responsible use of the seas for food for a hungry world. The latter involves the question of whether a coastal state ought to permit others to take fish it does not choose to take itself. Some sort of international authority to resolve disputes is the absolute minimum that should come from the conference.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
19 March 1975

Soviet Anti-Emigration Drive Charged

By JAMES F. CLARITY
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 18 — A group of Jewish activists asserted today that Soviet authorities were seeking to put an end to efforts of Moscow Jews to emigrate.

The official approach was said to involve indictments on serious charges and scheduled trials of some activists; threats of indictment against others, and permission for selected activists to emigrate as another way of weakening the Jewish movement.

Several Jews said at a news conference today that security police officers had told them in recent days that two detained Jews, Mark Nashpits and Boris Tsitlyonok, would soon be tried and found guilty, and that support for emigration efforts was fading in the West.

Test of Reaction

The activists said the campaign against them began in the last few weeks and appeared designed not only to stifle them, but also to test international reaction to the situation.

The Jews have said that while tens of thousands still want to emigrate, many have been discouraged by the collapse of the Soviet-American trade agreement. Moscow renounced the accord after Congress had made trade benefits dependent on free Soviet emigration.

The Soviet authorities have asserted that the number of Jews seeking to emigrate has fallen in recent months and that only 1,500 applications were pending in January.

At the news conference, in the apartment of one of the activists, it was reported that the two Jews facing trial had been indicted for disturbing public order during a recent demonstration. The penalty ranges from a fine to a three-year prison sentence.

Three activists at the news conference said that they had recently been summoned by the security police and told that if they did not stop their agitation for emigration, they would be charged with serious crimes. One of the three, Alexsandr Lunts, said he was told that he would be charged with treason, which is punishable by death.

Among the activists recently granted exit visas were the two adult sons of Veniamin G. Levich, a physicist who has been seeking to emigrate to Israel for several years, and Mikhail Agursky, a cybernetcist.

Mr. Agursky, a frequent intermediary between dissidents and Western correspondents, said at the conference that he was being allowed to leave because the authorities wanted to "eliminate a link between the Jewish movement and other movements."

American Effort Fails

By THEODORE SHABAD

A team of American law professors, headed by Telford Taylor of Columbia University, has sought unsuccessfully to induce the Soviet authorities to reopen the cases of about 20 political prisoners, most of them Jews, on the ground that due process was not observed at their trials.

The American group, acting on behalf of Israeli relatives of the prisoners, was permitted to file petitions in Moscow last June in an effort to gain new trials and to have conditions of the prisoners in labor camps eased.

After waiting several months without action by the Russians, the group presented its case at a news conference yesterday at the New York Bar Association, 42 West 44th Street.

Professor Taylor said that, strictly speaking, there was no basis in Soviet criminal procedure for representations by foreign lawyers, and that the group was gratified when the Soviet Prosecutor General, Roman A. Rudenko, agreed to receive the petitions.

Both Mr. Rudenko, and Professor Taylor served as prosecutors at the Nuremberg war-crimes trials of Nazi leaders in 1945-46.

Mr. Taylor recalled that they had a friendly hour-long conversation when they met again in Moscow last June 12, but that the Soviet official "became steely when it came to the matter at hand."

Mr. Rudenko's First Deputy, Mikhail P. Malyarov, informed the American legal team six days later by telephone that the petitions had been denied.

The legal briefs prepared by the Americans charged the following procedural violations:

¶Defendants were denied the right to choose their own counsel, and state-appointed lawyers were assigned for the defense on the ground that special security clearance was required in political cases.

¶Although most defendants were charged with having distributed anti-Soviet literature, no evidence was presented in open court to show that the material was anti-Soviet.

BALTIMORE SUN
19 March 1975

Jews say Moscow makes new threats

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—Jewish activists here charged Soviet authorities yesterday with launching a new campaign to intimidate Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel, particularly the movement's leaders.

They said that two young Moscow activists are about to be tried for a protest demonstration last month; that three others have been threatened with prosecution on more serious charges, including treason, and that provincial authorities are cracking down on local leaders.

At the same time, some leading Jewish activists are being allowed to emigrate, apparently to deprive the emigration movement of its leaders and spokesmen, the activists said.

The Moscow activists told Western newsmen here yesterday that they believe Soviet authorities have begun a program of calculated intimidation in an effort to "finish with this problem."

The Soviet secret police, the activists said in a statement, are trying "to use the present moment . . . for a 'final solution' of the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, letting certain activists out of the country and either intimidating or throwing others into jail."

The principal cause of the activists' alarm is the expected trial shortly of Mark Nashpits, a 26-year-old dentist, and Boris Tsitlyonok, a 30-year-old plumber, who have been indicted on charges of organizing or actively participating in a disruption of public order, for which they could be sentenced to three years in forced-labor camps.

The activists said that this is the first time any Moscow Jew has been charged with a political crime and the first time any has been indicted to face serious criminal charges following a demonstration here.

BALTIMORE SUN
19 March 1975

Russians grant visa for reunion

Moscow (AP)—Victoria Fyodorova, born of a World War II romance between an American admiral and a Russian actress, said yesterday she has received official permission to visit the father she has never met.

After a four-month campaign to leave this country for a reunion with her ailing father, retired Adm. Jackson R. Tate, the tall 29-year-old brunette said that she had been informed by Soviet passport officials that her visa has been approved.

Miss Fyodorova's 77-year-old father, who is suffering from a weak heart, lives in Orange Park, Fla., with his wife. Contacted at his home, he gave reporters a handwritten statement expressing "thankfulness to Secretary [(Leonid I.)] Brezhnev and the Russian people for this great gesture of humanitarianism."

"I thank them [(Soviet officials)] from the bottom of my heart, and I hope that Victoria will become an envoy of understanding and peace between the Soviet and American people," he said. "It is our greatest hope that this will be the major result of this reunion."

"I couldn't believe it," said Miss Fyodorova's mother, Zoya, when she learned that her daughter's visa had been granted.

Miss Fyodorova's mother fell in love with Officer Tate when he was an American naval attache in Moscow. Five months later, the officer was ordered out of Moscow, apparently because Stalin was irked by the romance.

Their last night together was on VE day in May 1945, and the child of their union was named for the victory.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1975

JUNE 30 DATE URGED FOR EUROPE SUMMIT

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, March 17—The Soviet Union wants the 35-nation European Security Conference to complete its negotiations here in time to call a summit session in Helsinki on June 30 to adopt a declaration on East-West détente, Western diplomats said tonight.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, proposed the June date in a letter to President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and Premier Aldo Moro of Italy, the diplomats said.

The conference, which has brought together the United States and Canada with all European countries except Albania, has been negotiating here since September, 1973, on measures for promoting East-West relations.

The Soviet Union, which first proposed the conference, is mainly concerned with seeing adopted a set of principles that would ratify the map of Europe that emerged from World War II.

Among issues remaining to be settled are those concerning freedom to travel, working conditions accorded foreign newsmen and other problems in the area of human contacts that are of prime interest to the West.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1975

Still No Law of the Sea

It is difficult to imagine the session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference which began yesterday in Geneva resolving all the disputed issues in a neat treaty which all the coastal and seafaring nations can accept. But it is very easy to picture the future if major progress is not made. The tuna war between the United States and Ecuador, the seabed war between South Vietnam and China, and anarchy over mining claims in the deep seabed will be repeated and escalated among many nations. Some nations, including the United States, may well find themselves on all sides of hotly disputed principles.

Although the conference session in Caracas last summer made disappointingly slow headway, it clarified a great deal. The delegates gathered in Geneva from almost all the countries of the world understand that any agreement they can reach will include a 12-mile territorial sea over which the coastal nation has sovereignty, a further 188-mile "economic zone" where it will manage resource exploitation, and an international regime for the deep seabed. Left unclarified is what each of these means. The United States holds out as paramount that the 12-mile territorial sea not diminish the unrestricted right of passage through international straits more than six miles wide, even by submerged submarine or military over flight. So dedicated to this is Washington that every other issue must be considered bargainable.

The economic zone, where the present fish wars and seabed disputes occur, could range from effective sovereignty to a rigidly limited set of rights and duties for the coastal state. The American view that coastal states control coastal and sea-water-freshwater fish but not ocean-roaming fish makes ecological sense and caters to the special interests of American in-shore and distant fishermen equally. But it may be difficult to sell as practical. Any successful definition of the economic zone should provide means of resolving bilateral seabed disputes, particularly those where one country has islands off another's coast. Disputes between Britain and France, Britain and Ireland, and Greece and Turkey center on this, and the last of these could easily lead to war.

The deep seabed is only slightly less urgent than the economic zone. Major research is beginning on ways to mine the mineral-rich nodules from the ocean floor. The more feasible such exploitation is shown to be, the greater the risk of a mining rush where no law prevails. The have-not states want an international authority itself to do the mining or rigidly control price and production if others do. Some mineral-producing countries with cartels in their eyes simply don't want ocean mining. The United States and most countries with mining capabilities want an international authority to do little more than register claims. Lately, compromising minds have suggested that a mix of mining by an international regime and by private companies is feasible.

The United States, somewhat against its tradition, wants compulsory arbitration of all disputes. It also properly fears coastal states setting up their own pollution standards for vessels sailing in the economic zone. These concerns are worth holding out for. A treaty or package of treaties cannot resolve every dispute at sea. It can—and for the future of mankind must—provide the means by which every dispute can be amicably settled.

JAPAN TIMES
28 February 1975

2 Drug Smugglers Get Life Sentence

TAIPEI (AP) — Two Hong Kong defendants in a narcotics trafficking case, Yeung Yin-hing and Chang Kwan-to, were sentenced Thursday to life imprisonment.

Miss Yeung burst into tears and declared "I would rather die than serve life in prison" after the verdicts were announced by Taipei District Court Judge Chang Chien-nan.

The two were arrested here after they arrived in Taiwan by boat Aug. 4. During their trial, the prosecution accused Hong Kong police of enabling them to escape from the crown colony.

At an earlier court session, Miss Yeung denied she had engaged in the sale of drugs either in Hong Kong or Taiwan, but said she had packed drugs in Hong Kong. Chan, who was said to be her bodyguard, denied any involvement in narcotics trafficking.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1975

Mariner 10

We are all so blasé these days that even near-miracles are taken for granted and little noted. Consider the case of Mariner 10, which rocketed from earth Nov. 3, 1973, and has traveled almost a *billion* miles since then.

In February of last year, Mariner 10 flew within 3,600 miles of Venus and radioed back the first close-up pictures ever taken of that planet, fundamentally influencing scientists' conceptions of the nature and behavior of Venus's extraordinarily dense and complex atmosphere.

Then, gaining extra energy from the gravity of Venus, Mariner 10 whipped off on a journey to Mercury and last March 29 it became the first human artifact to reach the neighborhood of that planet. On that day, then again last Sept. 21, and a third time last Sunday, Mariner 10 flawlessly executed photographic missions. A year ago virtually nothing of a detailed nature was known about the topography of Mercury, the sun's nearest neighbor. Now, thanks to Mariner 10, sharp pictures of a large part of Mercury's surface are available.

In a world where so much that is manufactured is shoddy, faulty in conception or the end result of workers who could not care less, it is worth remembering that men can also build durable, reliable and trustworthy mechanisms like Mariner 10 whose historic contribution to knowledge has substantially enhanced man's understanding of the solar system. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology and its contractors, responsible for Mariner 10 and its superlative performance have every reason for pride in their creation.

15. Relations With Academic World

Q. Mr. President. As Father Hesburgh put it in his speech today, you're the first President to set foot on a first-rate campus in about 10 years. In that context and in light of the fact that President Nixon fired Father Hesburgh from the Civil Rights Commission, I wonder if you'd elaborate on your feelings about restoring better relations with the academic world and the task ahead of you in that respect.

A. One of the first actions that I took, one of the first trips that I undertook, was to go to the campus of Ohio State University. I might say, parenthetically, for a Michigan graduate to go to Ohio State is doing double duty, but I was well received there and I had a fine opportunity to present a new concept that we have for higher education.

This is another opportunity on the Notre Dame campus to continue that dialogue that I hope will not only expand but grow by leaps and bounds between the academic community and the Federal Government. There's no reason why we shouldn't work together. There are a great many reasons why we should use the talent, the ability, the personnel that does exist on the campuses all over the United States and I certainly intend to do so in the months ahead.

Q. The second part of the question, how much of a job is there ahead of you to restore better relations?

A. Based on the very warm welcome I received at Notre Dame today, I think we're on a good footing, and I certainly will bend over backwards to continue it and to expand it.

I think the dialogue is excellent. About a week or 10 days ago I met with 10 or 15 top college and university presidents. That was another step in this better rapport between the academic community and this Administration.

I can assure you we intend to do everything possible to make sure that it works.

16. Aid to Congress

Q. Mr. President, will you be giving Congress all the material that is asked for as part of its investigation of intelligence activity?

A. The Senate committee has asked for a considerable amount of material. That request is currently being analyzed by the top members of my staff. I will make a judgment on that as soon as we've had an opportunity to review all of the very substantial number of requests.

I can assure you and others that we will do all we can to indicate maximum cooperation. But until we've had an opportunity to review this request in detail, I'm not in a position to give you a categorical answer.

Q. Am I to understand that this executive branch investigation [by] the Rockefeller commission would possibly make it necessary or advisable for you to delay giving Congress the material that is asked for?

A. I don't think there's any necessary conflict between the Rockefeller commission and the one or more Congressional committees. The Rockefeller commission has been in operation now for a month or two, so they're under way. They had planned to finish their work within the next month, as I recollect. They may have to go beyond that depending on certain circumstances.

But we intend to make as full a disclosure as is possible without jeopardizing America's national security.

17. Revenue-Sharing

Q. Mr. President, tonight you're meeting with several Midwestern governors. In light of some sagging revenues at the state and local levels, and your own budget tightening, what can you tell them about your long-range plans for return of the Federal dollar both to the state and municipalities under the revenue-sharing assessment?

A. In my State of the Union Message and in the Budget Message, I indicated that I was recommending an extension of the general revenue-sharing program with the annual add-on that takes care of the inflation impact as far as the state and local units of government are concerned.

So I'm on record, now, urging the Congress to extend the existing general revenue-sharing program.

Q. Mr. President, we haven't asked you about the gasoline tax lately. This afternoon, or this morning, on Air Force One, what Mr. Zarb said led me to believe that there may be a softening of the Administration's attitude. Are you still willing to stand by your earlier statement that you will veto any gasoline tax?

A. Well, I couldn't help but notice that over the weekend 102 Democrats joined in a statement in the House of Representatives condemning a gasoline tax.

I think a gasoline tax of the magnitude that several have proposed is not the right approach and I don't think the Congress will approve it.

I think the energy crisis, the energy program, can be best implemented by the proposal I submitted in January. And I hope that the negotiations between Mr. Zarb and myself with the members of the Congress on the respective committees will result in an approach that is comparable to mine, because I think the Congress will pass that.

I have very grave doubts that the Congress would pass a gasoline tax, and certainly my feeling in that regard was reaffirmed by 102 Democrats putting their name on the line, saying they wouldn't vote for one. And I think there's a better way to do it and we're going to work with the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means hoping to find an answer that is more like the approach that I have recommended.

18. Stand on Gasoline Tax

Q. To follow that up, you did say a gasoline tax of the magnitude that's being proposed by some. It seems to indicate a shift in your position there. Mr. Ullman has come down from 40 cents to possibly 25 cents. Now if he were to come down a little further, would you be willing to talk about maybe a 20-cent tax?

A. I read a news report a few minutes ago which said that the bill that he had introduced included a gas tax up to 37 cents over a three or four-year span. I don't think that's the right approach and I don't think it's feasible in trying to get the Congress to act.

Therefore I go back to a program that we proposed, which I think will be the answer, which I think the Congress eventually will buy substantially.

I'm very happy that we are negotiating, we are trying to find an answer with Mr. Ullman, the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. And I am encouraged by what I understand is the progress that's being made.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

East-west trade

Hokum Cocom

Rumour of American opposition to the possible sale of Rolls-Royce Spey aero-engines to China has dragged out of the shadows (where it normally prefers to lurk) the strange beast called Cocom. Cocom is a Paris-based co-ordinating committee on which sit all Nato members (except Iceland) and Japan, and has been responsible ever since 1949 for compiling lists of strategic goods that the western powers wanted to deny to the communists. Chincom, son of Cocom, has been doing the same for China since 1950. Any strategic and security objections to a western deal with a communist power is voiced in one of them.

At the time of the Korean war from 1950 to 1953, when tension between the west and the communist powers was at its greatest, western strategic embargo lists included between a third and a half of all items in world trade. Since 1954 these lists have been progressively whittled down to what are considered to be items of real military significance. Even those are revised downwards every three years.

But even at the height of the cold war, Cocom and Chincom were pretty toothless bodies, whose instructions were honoured more in breach than in observance by member countries. Communist countries still managed to get what they really wanted, from ball-bearings to diamond tools, through international rings operating from Antwerp to Hongkong and businessmen exploiting loopholes left in Cocom instructions. Some western analysts estimate that only some 5 per cent of Soviet defence and investment resources were affected by the western strategic embargo.

The strategic embargo policy has been a constant bone of contention among the western powers for years, with the Americans usually in the role of the virtuous practitioners embittered by their partners' faithlessness. Britain first breached the China embargo back in 1957. But it is unlikely that the Americans would now be trying to interfere with British trade with China. They are busy denying any knowledge of the whole thing. It is much more likely that the Russians are concerned at the possible sale of an aero-engine that could, though with some difficulty, be adapted for military purposes, to their hostile neighbour in the east. Western observers in Moscow say that the issue was not broached during the Wilson visit, but there is still time. Does Russia want to join in Cocom?

NEW YORK TIMES March 17, 1975

The Sharks at Geneva

The Law of the Sea Conference which reconvenes in Geneva today offers the last chance that the international community can anticipate to organize for orderly use and exploitation, for the benefit of all mankind, of the more than two-thirds of this planet that is covered by water.

The stakes are high. They include, in addition to traditional rights of passage on and above the high seas and through more than 100 threatened straits: an estimated 1,500 billion barrels of petroleum under the sea floor, one of the world's last great, largely-untapped, energy resources; an endangered fish stock which currently yields $18 billion worth of high-protein food annually, and an estimated $3 trillion worth of manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel concentrated in golfball-sized nodules scattered on the deep ocean bed.

Also at issue are the vitally important right of free scientific research in the oceans and the ability of nations cooperatively to halt the spreading pollution that scientists like Thor Heyerdahl have warned threatens to destroy all life in the oceans and ultimately man himself.

The prospects are not bright for agreement at Geneva on the comprehensive body of new sea law that is urgently needed. Malta Ambassador Arvid Parvo's statesmanlike call in 1967 for the sharing of ocean resources as "the common heritage of mankind" has long since been lost in an unruly scramble for national and ideological aggrandizement. After last summer's near-fiasco at the first conference session in Caracas, Ambassador Pardo, one of the world's experts on the subject, lamented: "The situation right now is like sharks smelling blood in the water; they go crazy, attacking the carcass, tear it to pieces—and kill each other, all at the same time. The states are trying to swallow the carcass of ocean space beyond national jurisdiction and, in the process, are very likely to inflict serious injury on themselves."

The only hope for Geneva lies in recognition by the sharks that their own best interests, perhaps even their survival, lies in some accommodation to the general interest. Too many developing countries have hewed too long to a rigidly anti-West, ideological line laid down for the so-called Group of 77 by a self-serving minority of geographically-favored states.

At the other extreme, United States policy has been too much dominated in at least one critical area of the conference—that dealing with exploitation of the deep sea bed—by the interests of a few American mining companies, dogmatically interpreted by the Department of the Interior to the detriment of other vital United States concerns.

All nations have a stake in the success of the Law of the Sea Conference, none greater than that of the United States with its long coastlines and worldwide naval, maritime and resource involvement. It is essential that President Ford give his able Special Representative, John R. Stevenson, the flexibility and support he will need to negotiate reasonable compromises, responsive to the broad spectrum of American and international interests at sea.

NY TIMES 3/18/75

SEA-LAW SESSIONS RESUME IN GENEVA

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, March 17—About 140 nations resumed today an attempt to reconcile diverging interests by drafting a global charter to govern use of the seas.

There was general recognition among the more than 2,000 delegates that the goal was still toodistant to be reached in the eight weeks allotted them.

The conference president, Hamilton S. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, said on the eve of the session that another round of negotiations would have to be held before the delegations could return for a signing ceremony at Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, where the first session was held for 10 weeks last summer.

At Caracas the conference did little more than bring into focus the conflicting views on the many issues. These range from the width of the territorial sea to the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the seabed beyond the jurisdiction of costal states and the rights of land-locked countries.

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1975

Sea-Law Talks Resume Today in Geneva, With U.S. Hopeful

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas resumes tomorrow in Geneva, with American negotiators hopeful of agreeing on a draft treaty.

They say they are convinced that if no draft is produced this time, no treaty will emerge for a long time.

About 140 delegations from nations and international organizations will meet for eight weeks. They will pick up where they left off last summer in Caracas, Venezuela.

At the end of the Caracas session, the delegates were nearing agreement on extending territorial jurisdiction to 12 miles and on establishing a 200-mile economic resource zone, including the 12-mile territorial sea. There was little progress on jurisdiction over deep seabed mining.

Meanwhile, the United States Congress is considering a bill to extend American fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles until a treaty is agreed upon and to start mining of the deep seabed if there is no treaty by 1976.

A Test of Diplomacy

Many diplomats view the sea-law conference as a test case of multisided diplomacy, a technique used by the United Nations over the last two years to try to grapple with global problems. These include the food conference held in Rome, the population conference in Bucharest, and the resource session in New York.

Those in the Ford Administration who have been interested in a sea-law treaty are known not to have received much attention at the highest levels of government.

They want to avoid the kinds of conflicts over territorial jurisdictions at sea that are bound to emerge in the absence of a treaty. The Pentagon, in particular, is committed to a treaty that guarantees unimpeded access for naval vessels to international straits.

If coastal and island nations were to extend their jurisdictions from the traditional three miles to 12 miles, more than 100 straits would come under national rather than international law.

U.S. Delegate Hopeful

John R. Stevenson, head of the American delegation to the conference, said in an interview that the United States had been in contact with other nations since the Caracas session and that he was hopeful that compromises could be reached.

But Ann L. Hollick, a Johns Hopkins University expert on this subject, said in the current issue of Foreign Policy, a monthly magazine, that there are contrary trends.

"Some nations are interested in delaying the negotiations either because their interests in the oceans are not yet clearly perceived or, in other cases, because they expect to realize gains in their positions by delays," she wrote.

"Working in the opposite direction in the developed countries are domestic pressures to resolve specific ocean regimes so that commercial and strategic users may go about their business without further uncertainties or delays."

The major issue on extending the territorial limit to 12 miles is the right of unimpeded access through straits. The United States is making acceptance of this provision a precondition for signing the treaty.

A number of issues have to be resolved on the 200-mile economic resource zone. They include the rights of other countries if a nation cannot fully utilize the fish, mineral, and petroleum resources in its zone; special treatment for migratory fish like tuna and salmon; international standards for pollution and conservation, and revenue-sharing with the land-locked nations.

Another question is whether the zone would extend to continental shelves extending beyond the 200-mile limit. Much of the offshore petroleum is involved in this issue.

Seabed mining is important because manganese nodules on the seabed contain copper and nickel. As of now, only a few nations, including the United States, have the technology to do the mining.

Developing nations want to share in this technology and in the profits and use of the resources on the ground that the seabed is common property. The issue of an international seabed authority is central in this context.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 March 1975

U.S. OFFERS SOVIET ARMS DRAFT TREATY

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 16—The United States has proposed a draft treaty to the Soviet Union ti encompass an agreement reached last November at Vladivostok to limit offensive missiles and bombers.

Reporters aboard Secretary of State Kissinger's Air Force jet were told today while flying here from Jordan that the proposed language was presented to Soviet negotiators in Geneva about 10 days ago or so.

The National Security Council was said to have discussed the proposed treaty on March 5, shortly before Mr. Kissinger left for the Middle East.

The American document was believed a formal response to an initial Soviet draft treaty presented to the United States at the end of January when the strategic arms limitation talks resume in Geneva.

In Vladivostok, President Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, agreed to an over-all limit of 2,400 strategic missiles and bombers for a period that would run through 1985. Of the 2,400 total, up to 1,320 could be missiles with independently targeted warheads, the so-called Mirv's.

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